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Compositional Game Theory is a new, recently introduced model of economic games based 
upon the computer science idea of compositionality. In it, complex and irregular games can 
be built up from smaller and simpler games, and the equilibria of these complex games can 
be deﬁned recursively from the equilibria of their simpler subgames. This paper extends 
the model by providing a ﬁnal coalgebra semantics for inﬁnite games. In the course of 
this, we introduce a new operator on games to model the economic concept of subgame 
perfection.
 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the 
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
As one of Don’s PhD students, I have always admired Don’s commitment to (i) fundamental research which would stand the test 
of time; (ii) taking seriously the real-world problems that inspire research; and (iii) the power of categorical tools for devising com-
positional techniques for treating complex phenomena. It is therefore a great pleasure to dedicate this work to him, as it embodies 
exactly these qualities: using category theory to devise a compositional treatment of infinite games that occur in economic modelling. 
Additionally, Don showed me great kindness and support throughout my career, e.g. by funding part of my post-doc even though my 
research was not directly related to his. This selfless support for future generations is something I am extremely grateful for, and have 
tried to replicate in my own dealings with younger academics.
Professor Neil Ghani
1. Introduction
Compositionality, where one sees complex systems as being built from smaller subsystems, is widely regarded within 
computer science as a key enabling technique for scalability. Since the subsystems are smaller, they are easier to reason 
about, and compositionality also promotes modularity and reuse; a particular system can be a subsystem of many different 
supersystems. Can compositionality be applied also to economic games? In general, not all reasoning is compositional, 
especially if signiﬁcant emergent behaviour is present in a large system but not in its subsystems. This is unfortunately the 
case for economic games. For example, if σ is an optimal strategy for a game G , then is σ part of an optimal strategy for 
G ∗H, where G ∗H is a super-game built from G and H? Clearly not, e.g. the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has equilibria — such 
as cooperative equilibria — that do not arise from repeatedly playing the Nash equilibrium from the Prisoner’s Dilemma [2].
However, Ghani et al. [3] produced a compositional model of game theory which included a limited set of operators 
for building new games from old. One shortcoming was that this did not treat the inﬁnite iteration of games, or more 
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Fig. 1. Payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
generally contain an operator to compositionally build inﬁnite iterations of games. This paper addresses that problem. 
Within programming language theory, these sort of issues are tackled by ﬁnal coalgebra semantics [10] and we follow this 
practice, with the added beneﬁt of bringing related bisimulation techniques to the game theory community. We highlight 
two relationships between our work and traditional approaches:
• Each round of an inﬁnite game produces utility. Traditionally, this inﬁnite sequence of staged utilities is combined into 
a single utility in one of a number of ad hoc manners. We take the bolder approach of not requiring the choice of a 
single mechanism for combining utilities.
• The coalgebraic approach we advocate dovetails well with the economic concept of subgame perfection, where a strategy 
must be an optimal response in all subgames of the supergame [13].
The general approach of Compositional Game Theory deals with a new concept of coutility. However this paper makes 
the simplifying assumption that the coutility function is the identity. Despite this, our approach covers many games, as 
those occurring in the traditional literature do not possess coutility.
Related Work. An introduction to the economic treatment of iterated games can be found in Mailath and Samuelson [5]. The 
fundamental concept of game theory is that of Nash equilibrium [7], which has been adapted for the study of repeated 
and dynamic games to the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium ﬁrst introduced by Selten [12]. Signiﬁcantly influential 
work on using logical methods and coalgebraic reasoning in economics include Lescanne [4] and Abramsky and Winschel 
[1]. Open games are also closely related to the ‘partially deﬁned games’ of Oliva and Powell [8].
Structure of the paper. Section 2 consists of preliminaries and a summary of previous work on open games; Section 3 in-
troduces an operator for dealing with subgame perfection; Section 4 introduces morphisms between games, and Section 5
consists of our ﬁnal coalgebra semantics for inﬁnite open games. In Section 6, we show how bisimulation and coinduction 
can be used to reason about inﬁnitely repeated games. Finally Section 7 contains concluding remarks and discussions of 
further work.
2. Preliminaries
The key concept of Ghani et al. [3] is the following:
Definition 1 (Open Game). Let X , Y , R and S be sets. An open game G = (G , PG , CG , EG) : (X, S) → (Y , R) consists of:
• a set G , called the set of strategy profiles of G ,
• a function PG :G × X → Y , called the play function of G ,
• a function CG :G × X × R → S , called the coutility function of G , and
• a function EG : X × (Y → R) →PG , called the equilibrium function of G .
We sometimes write G : (X, S) 

−→ (Y , R) to make the set of strategies explicit. Intuitively, the set X contains the possible 
states or histories of the game, Y the moves, R the utilities and S the coutilities. The set G contains the strategies we are 
trying to pick an optimal one from. The play function PG selects a move given a strategy and a state, while the coutility 
function CG chooses the coutility to extrude from the game, given a strategy, state and utility. Finally, if σ ∈ EG x k, then σ
is an optimal strategy in state x and with utility given by k : Y → R . Permitting arbitrary equilibrium functions, as opposed 
to only considering ﬁxed ones, is one of the key steps for achieving compositionality.
Example 2. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two suspects in a major crime are held in separate cells. Each of them can be convicted 
of a minor offence, but unless one of them acts as an informer against the other, there is not enough evidence for a major 
conviction. Each prisoner must decide to either cooperate with the other prisoner and stay quiet, or to defect and betray the 
other. If both stay quiet, each will spend one year in prison, while if one and only one defects, she will walk away free and 
be used as a witness against the other prisoner, who will spend ﬁve years in prison. However if they both defect, they will 
each spend three years in prison. The situation is summarised in Fig. 1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is represented as an open 
game
PD : (1,R×R)→ ({C, D} × {C, D},R×R)
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as follows: The history of the game is trivial (so X = 1, a singleton set), and the moves of the game consists of a choice to 
cooperate or defect for each player (so Y = {C, D} ×{C, D}). Both utility and coutility is represented by the number of years 
lost in prison for each player (so R = S =R ×R). A strategy simply consists of choosing a move, so PD = {C, D} × {C, D}, 
with play function PPD(x, m) =m. Coutility is given by CPD(m, x, r) = r, while
(m1,m2) ∈ EPD(x,k)⇔m1 ∈ argmax(π1 ◦ k(−,m2)) and
m2 ∈ argmax(π2 ◦ k(m1,−))
We see that (m1, m2) ∈ EPD(x, k) exactly when (m1, m2) is a Nash equilibrium. No particular utility function is hardcoded 
into this game; we get the concrete Prisoner’s Dilemma by specialising to the utility function k corresponding to the payoff 
matrix in Fig. 1, in which case (D, D) is the only equilibrium.
The main result of Ghani et al. [3] can be stated as follows:
Theorem 3. The collection of pairs of sets, with open games G : (X, S) → (Y , R) as morphisms, forms a symmetric monoidal category 
Open.1
Proof. The composition of G and H is given by the game with strategies H◦G =G ×H , play function the composition 
of the respective play functions from H and G , and coutility function the composition in reverse of the coutility functions 
from H and G , using the play function of G to produce a state for H. Finally (σ1, σ2) ∈ EH◦G x k if and only if σ1 ∈ EG x k
′ , 
where k′ y = CH σ2 y (k (PH σ2 y)), and σ2 ∈ EH (PG σ
′ x) k for all σ ′ ∈G .
The monoidal product is given by Cartesian product in the category of sets, with componentwise action on the strate-
gies, play functions and coutility functions of open games, and (σ1, σ2) ∈ EG⊗H (x1, x2) k if and only if σ1 ∈ EG x1 ((π1 ◦
k)(_, PH σ2 x2)) and σ2 ∈ EH x2 ((π2 ◦ k)(PG σ1 x1, _)). The unit of this monoidal structure is (1, 1), while the symmetry is 
inherited from the Cartesian product in Set. 
Returning to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we see that it can be composed from simpler games as follows:
Example 4. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game PD : (1, R ×R) → ({C, D} × {C, D}, R ×R) from Example 2 arises as
PD = G ⊗ G
where G : (1, R) 
{C,D}
−−−→ ({C, D}, R) is the game with play function PG(x, m) = m, coutility function CG(x, m, r) = r and 
equilibrium function EG(x, k) = argmax k. We can further hardwire a speciﬁc utility function k by creating a closed game
Uk ◦PD : (1, R ×R) → (1, 1) by composing PD with the game Uk : ({C, D} × {C, D}, R ×R) 
1
−→ (1, 1), where Uk has trivial 
play function, coutility function CUk (m, y, x) = k(y), and every strategy is an equilibrium. It is not hard to see that (m1, m2) ∈
EPD(x, k) if and only if (m1, m2) ∈ EUk◦PD(x, !), where ! : 1 → 1 is the unique function into 1. However, we prefer to work 
with open games without speciﬁed utility functions whenever possible, so that we can compose them into larger games as 
needed.
3. Subgame perfection and conditioning
Intuitively, we play two rounds of a game by composing the game with itself. However, this is not quite right: in the 
composite game H◦G = H ×G , and thus the second game H cannot react to the moves played by the ﬁrst game G . 
This clearly does not match practice as any later play should be able to react differently to different previous plays. Further, 
an optimal strategy should react optimally to all previous plays, even if those previous plays are sub-optimal. In the game-
theoretic literature, this is known as subgame perfection (see also Abramsky and Winschel [1] for a coalgebraic treatment). 
Rather than introduce a new form of composition, we introduce a new operator A → (−) for conditioning a game to react 
to every possibility in some set A.
Definition 5. Let A be a set. Given a game H : (X, S) 

−→ (Y , R), we deﬁne the game A →H : (A × X, S) 
A→
−−−→ (A × Y , R)
with
• play function P A→H (a, x) ( f : A →H) = (a, PH x ( f a))
• coutility function C A→H (a, x) f r = CH x ( f a) r
1 Actually, one needs to quotient by the equivalence relation induced by isomorphism of strategies, but we simplify presentation here by dealing with 
representatives directly.
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• equilibrium function
f ∈ E A→H(a, x) (k : A × Y → R) iff (∀a
′ ∈ A) f a′ ∈ EH x k(a
′, _)
Note how the description of subgame perfection in the previous paragraph is reflected mathematically by requiring a 
strategy in A →H to be a set of strategies, one for each element of A, and that for a strategy f to be optimal in A →H, 
each of its components must be optimal in H. Clearly we have:
Lemma 6. The mappings (X, S) 
→ (A × X, S) and H 
→ (A →H) define a functor A → (−) : Open → Open. 
This functor is not only of interest for inﬁnite iterations of games, but more generally allows any game to observe 
information and react accordingly.
4. 2-cells and coutility-free games
Given a game G : (X, S) 

−→ (Y , R), we will construct its inﬁnite iteration Gω compositionally as the ﬁnal coalgebra of 
the functor FG(H) := (Y →H) ◦ G . However, this means that games will acquire universal properties and thus we need a 
notion of morphism between games. Further, Gω will satisfy Gω ∼= (Y → Gω) ◦ G , and hence the equation
CGω xσ r = CG xσ0 (CGω x
′ σ1 r)
relating the coutilities of Gω and G must hold. Here, the strategy σ for Gω decomposes into σ0 for the ﬁrst round and σ1
for later rounds, and x′ is the state after completing the ﬁrst round. This equation does not always have a unique solution — 
e.g. if CG x σ r = r. To recover uniqueness, we restrict to games G where CG x σ r = r in this paper. This is not a severe 
restriction, as there is no coutility in traditional game theory. We will also only consider state-free games. We are currently 
working on removing both these restrictions. Next, for FG(H) to type check, the utility and coutility sets of G must be 
the same, and thus we only consider games whose utility and coutility is a ﬁxed set R . To summarise: in this paper we 
consider games G : (1, R) 

−→ (Y , R) with state 1, utility and coutility the set R , and coutility function CG σ r = r. We deﬁne 
morphisms between such games as follows:
Definition 7. Let R be a set. Given two games G : (1, R) 

−→ (Y , R) and G′ : (1, R) 
′
−→ (Y ′, R), a morphism α : G → G′ consists 
of a pair of functions α = (αY : Y → Y
′,α : →
′) such that
(i) αY (P σ ) = P
′ (α σ ), and
(ii) for every σ ∈ and k : Y ′ → R , if σ ∈ E (k ◦ αY ) then α(σ ) ∈ E
′ k.
We trust the reader will not be confused by the fact that games are morphisms in Open but also have morphisms 
between them — this simply reflects inherent 2-categorical structure. The category whose objects are open games G :
(1, R) 

−→ (Y , R) for some , Y (and a ﬁxed R), and whose morphisms are the morphisms between such open games is 
denoted 2OpenR . We are now in position to deﬁne the functor FG : 2OpenR → 2OpenR whose ﬁnal coalgebra will be the 
inﬁnite iteration of the game G .
Theorem 8. Let R be a set and G : (1, R) 

−→ (Y , R). The mapping FG(H) = (Y → H) ◦ G extends to a functor FG : 2OpenR →
2OpenR .
Proof. Given a morphism α :H→H′ , deﬁne FG(α) : FG(H) → FG(H
′) by
(FG(α)) (σ , f )= (σ ,α ◦ f ) (FG(α))Y (y, z)= (y,αY z)
The play function and equilibrium preservation conditions are easily checked. 
5. The iterated game as a final coalgebra
From now on, let R be an arbitrary set, used as utility and coutility for all our games, and write 2Open for 2OpenR .
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5.1. Definition of the iterated game
Let us ﬁx an arbitrary open game G : (1, R) 

−→ (Y , R) that we want to iterate inﬁnitely often via the ﬁnal coalge-
bra of the functor FG : 2Open → 2Open from the previous section, mapping H : (1, R) 
H
−−→ (YH, R) to (Y →H) ◦ G :
(1, R) 
×(Y→H)
−−−−−−−−→ (Y × YH, R). We ﬁrst describe FG -coalgebras, then our candidate Gω for the ﬁnal FG -coalgebra, and 
conclude with a proof that Gω really is ﬁnal. As a ﬁrst step we need to recall two endofunctors on the category of sets, and 
their ﬁnal coalgebras.
Fact 9. Given two sets I and O we let D(I, O ) : Set → Set be the functor given by D(I, O )X := O  × X I and by D(I, O )( f : X →
Y ) := idO × f
I . Furthermore, for a set Y , we define the functor S(Y ) : Set → Set by putting S(Y )X = Y × X and S(Y )( f : X → Y ) :=
idY × f . The final D(I, O )-coalgebra is
(I∗ → O )
〈now,ltr〉
O × (I∗ → O )I
where I∗ is the set of finite words over I , and now( f ) := f (ǫ) and ltr( f ) = λi.λw. f (iw) (cf. Rutten [9, Ex. 9.5]2). The final 
S(Y )-coalgebra is
Yω
〈hd,tl〉
Y × Yω
where Yω is the set of infinite streams over Y , hd(y0 y1 . . . ) := y0 , i.e., hd maps a stream to its first element (its “head”) and 
tl(y0 y1 y2 . . . ) := y1 y2 . . . , i.e., tl maps a stream to its tail (cf. Rutten [9, Ex. 9.4]).
The above ﬁnal coalgebras are fundamental for our representation of iterated games: The ﬁnal S(Y )-coalgebra consists 
of all inﬁnite sequences of moves of the one-round game, while the ﬁnal D(Y , )-coalgebra represents the set of strategies 
that map lists of moves — representing moves chosen in previous rounds — to a strategy for the next round. As notation, for 
σ : Y ∗ → we abbreviate now(σ ) to σ0 , ltr(σ ) to σ
′ , and use (::) : Y × Yω → Yω to denote the cons-operator on streams. 
We now deﬁne the ω-iteration of G .
Definition 10. The ω-iteration Gω : (1, R) → (Y
ω, R) of G : (1, R) → (Y , R) has strategies Gω given by Gω := Y
∗ → G , 
and play function PGω given by
PGωσ = PGσ0 :: PGω (λz.σ (PGσ0 :: z))
To deﬁne the equilibrium function EGω : (Y
ω → R) → PGω , we ﬁrst deﬁne an operator 	 : (PGω )
(Yω→R) →
(PGω )
(Yω→R) by putting
σ ∈	Ŵk if σ0 ∈ EG(λy.k(y :: PGω (σ
′ y))) (1)
and ∀y′ ∈ Y . σ ′ y′ ∈ Ŵ(λz.k(y′ :: z)) (2)
Clearly (PGω )
(Yω→R) forms a complete lattice by lifting the complete lattice structure of PGω pointwise to the function 
space. Furthermore, 	 is obviously a monotone operator on that complete lattice and therefore has a smallest and a greatest 
ﬁxpoint. We deﬁne EGω to be the greatest ﬁxpoint of 	.
Notice that the above approach means we do not have to ﬁx a particular utility function Yω → R in advance by some 
arbitrary form of discounting, but rather work with all possible utility functions, allowing the user maximum flexibility. 
The deﬁnition of EGω contains a coinduction principle which we will use (i) in this section to characterise Gω as a ﬁnal 
coalgebra; and (ii) in Section 6 to prove properties about equilibria in Gω . The coinduction principle is
(∀ Ŵ ∈ (PGω )
(Yω→R)) (Ŵ≤	(Ŵ)=⇒ Ŵ≤ EGω )
where ≤ denotes the pointwise inclusion order on (PGω )
(Yω→R) given by Ŵ ≤ if Ŵ(k) ⊆(k) for all k : Yω → R . This 
principle is sound, as the following lemma shows:
Lemma 11. Let σ ∈Gω . Then
(i) for all utility functions k : Yω → R we have σ ∈ EGω (k) if and only if σ ∈	(EGω )(k), and
(ii) for every Ŵ ∈ (PGω )
(Yω→R) , if Ŵ ≤	(Ŵ) then also Ŵ ≤ EGω .
2 Rutten [9] proves this for I = 2 but the argument can be easily adapted for arbitrary I .
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Proof. The ﬁrst item follows since EGω is a ﬁxpoint of 	, the second because it is the greatest such, thus also the greatest 
post-ﬁxpoint with respect to the order ≤. 
5.2. Proof of finality
In this section we are going to show that Gω is a ﬁnal coalgebra of the functor FG = (Y → (−)) ◦ G : 2Open → 2Open . 
We have two things to show:
(i) Gω is an FG -coalgebra, and
(ii) for any other FG -coalgebra γ :H→ FG(H), there exists a unique FG -coalgebra morphism (unf,unfY ) :H→ Gω .
The ﬁrst item is formulated in the following proposition, and follows straightforwardly using Lemma 11:
Proposition 12. The ω-iteration Gω of G is an FG -coalgebra with coalgebra map α = (〈now, ltr〉 , 〈hd, tl〉) : Gω → FG(Gω). 
We are now ready to prove that Gω indeed is the ﬁnal FG -coalgebra. To this end we consider an arbitrary FG -coalgebra 
H with coalgebra map (〈nowH, ltrH〉 , 〈hdH, tlH〉). We have to prove that there is a morphism 〈unf,unfY 〉 :H→ Gω such 
that the following diagram commutes:
FGH
FG (unf,unfY )
FGGω
H
(〈nowH,ltrH〉,〈hdH,tlH〉)
(unf,unfY )
Gω
(〈now,ltr〉,〈hd,tl〉)
It is easy to see that such a FG-coalgebra morphism — if it exists — must be unique because commutativity of the above 
diagram implies commutativity of the following two diagrams in the category of sets:
G ×
Y
H
D(Y ,G )(unf)
G ×
Y
Gω
H
〈nowH,ltrH〉
unf
Gω
〈now,ltr〉
Y × YH
idY×(unfY )
Y × Yω
YH
〈hdH,tlH〉
unfY
Yω
〈hd,tl〉 (3)
In other words unf and unfY have to be D(Y , G)- and S(Y )-coalgebra morphisms, respectively, and these are uniquely 
determined by the fact that their codomains are the respective ﬁnal coalgebras.
This means that to show that Gω is a ﬁnal FG -coalgebra, we have to prove that the pair of functions 〈unf,unfY 〉 deﬁned 
via the diagrams in (3) is a FG -coalgebra morphism. We need several lemmas.
Lemma 13. For every σ ∈H we have unfY (PH(σ )) = PGω (unf(σ )).
Proof. To see this, we deﬁne the relation
Q := {(unfY (PH(σ )), PGω (unf(σ ))) | σ ∈H} ⊆ Y
ω × Yω .
Using Proposition 12 and (3), it is not hard to prove that Q is a S(Y )-bisimulation, i.e., that for each (τ1, τ2) ∈ Q we have 
hd(τ1) = hd(τ2) and (tl(τ1), tl(τ2)) ∈ Q . From the coinduction principle it follows that any two streams related by Q are 
equal, which implies the lemma. 
We now turn to the veriﬁcation of the equilibrium condition for (unf,unfY ). First we use (unf,unfY ) to deﬁne an 
indexed predicate on Gω (which can be thought of as the image of EH under (unf,unfY )). This predicate will be a 
post-ﬁxpoint of 	 which will then imply the desired equilibrium condition.
Definition 14. We deﬁne an indexed predicate EˆH : (Y
ω → R) →PGω by putting σ ∈ EˆHk if ∃σ
′ ∈H s.t. unf(σ
′) = σ
and σ ′ ∈ EH(k ◦ unfY ).
Definition 15. We deﬁne a map (_)∗ : (Yω → R) → (Y × YH → R) by putting k
∗ = λy.λz.k(y :: unfY (z)).
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Lemma 16. For k : Yω → R and σ ′ ∈H , if σ
′ ∈ EH(k ◦ unfY ), then
(i) nowH(σ
′) ∈ EG(λy.k
∗(y, PH(ltrH(σ
′)(y)))), and
(ii) for all y′ ∈ Y we have ltr(σ ′)(y′) ∈ EH(λz.k
∗(y′, z)).
Proof. Suppose σ ′ ∈ EH(k ◦ unfY ). Observe that k ◦ unfY = k
∗ ◦ 〈hdH, tlH〉, so this is equivalent to σ
′ ∈ EH(k
∗ ◦ 〈hdH, tlH〉)
and — as 〈hdH, tlH〉 is a morphism of open games — we obtain 〈nowH, ltrH〉 (σ
′) ∈ E FGH(k
∗). The lemma now follows by 
spelling out the deﬁnition of E FGH(k
∗). 
We are now ready to prove the key fact that EˆH is a post-ﬁxpoint of 	.
Lemma 17. Let σ ∈Gω be a strategy such that σ ∈ EˆHk for some k : Y
ω → R . Then σ ∈	(EˆH)(k).
Proof. The assumption σ ∈ EˆHk means that there is some σ
′ ∈ H such that unf(σ
′) = σ and σ ′ ∈ EH(k ◦ unfY ). We 
need to verify that
(a) now(σ ) ∈ EG(λy.k(y :: PGω ltr(σ )(y))), and
(b) for all y′ ∈ Y we have ltr(σ )(y′) ∈ EˆH(λz.k(y
′ :: z)).
For (a), note that by the diagram for strategies in (3) we have now(σ ) = now(unf(σ
′)) = nowH(σ
′). Using the ﬁrst item 
of Lemma 16, we obtain
now(σ ) ∈ EG(λy.k
∗(y, PH(ltrH(σ
′)(y))))
= EG(λy.k(y :: unfY (PH(ltrH(σ
′)(y)))))
Lemma 13
= EG(λy.k(y :: PGω (unf(ltrH(σ
′)(y)))))
(3)
= EG(λy.k(y :: PGω (ltr(unf(σ
′))(y))))
= EG(λy.k(y :: PGω (ltr(σ )(y))))
which establishes (a).
For (b), it suﬃces to deﬁne for each y′ ∈ Y a suitable strategy σ ′
y′
∈ H such that unfσ
′
y′
= ltr(σ )(y′) and σ ′
y′
∈
EH(λz.k(y
′ :: unfY z)). We claim that for an arbitrary y
′ ∈ Y the strategy σ ′
y′
:= ltrH(σ
′)(y′) meets these conditions. The 
ﬁrst condition is again an easy consequence of (3) and the fact that unf(σ
′) = σ . For the second condition we note that 
σ ′y ∈ EH(λz.k
∗(y′, z)) as a consequence of σ ′ ∈ EH(k ◦unfY ) and the second item of Lemma 16. The claim follows now from 
σ ′
y′
∈ EH(λz.k
∗(y′, z)) = EH(λz.(y
′ :: unfY (z))). 
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 18. Let G : (1, R) → (Y , R) be an open game and let Gω be its ω-iteration. Then Gω is a final FG -coalgebra.
Proof. By our discussion at the beginning of this subsection it suﬃces to show that for an arbitrary FG -coalgebra 
(H, (〈nowH, ltrH〉 , 〈hdH, tlH〉)) the map (unf,unfY ) consisting of the coalgebra morphisms in (3) is a morphism of open 
games. Lemma 13 shows that (unf,unfY ) satisﬁes the play function morphism condition. For checking the equilibrium con-
dition, consider an arbitrary σ ′ ∈H and a k : Y
ω → R such that σ ′ ∈ EH(k ◦unfY ). Then clearly we have unf(σ
′) ∈ EˆH(k). 
As EˆH is a post-ﬁxpoint of 	 by Lemma 17, we have EˆH(k) ⊆ EGω (k), and thus unf(σ
′) ∈ EGω (k) as required. 
6. Using coinduction to reason about infinite games
In this section we show how the coinduction principle inherent in the deﬁnition of the equilibrium EGω of the 
ω-iteration of a game G as a ﬁnal coalgebra can be used to reason about equilibria in inﬁnite games.
We will spell out a coinductive proof of the well-known fact that the strategy pair consisting of two grim trigger strate-
gies is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma for suﬃciently large discount factors [6]. To this 
aim consider the inﬁnite iteration PDω of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game PD from Example 2. Recall that the one-round 
game
PD : (1,R×R)
PD
−−−→ (Y ,R×R)
has PD = Y = {C, D} × {C, D}, the coplay and play functions are identity functions, and the equilibrium EPD : (Y →
R ×R) →PD is given by
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(s0, s1) ∈ EPD(u : Y →R×R) if π0u(s0, s1)≥ π0u(t, s1)
and π1u(s0, s1)≥ π1u(s0, t) for all t ∈ {C, D}
Furthermore we consider the utility function uPD of the one-round Prisoner’s Dilemma as speciﬁed in Fig. 1 on page 
49. The discounted utility for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma k
β
IPD
: Yω → R with discount factor β ∈ [0, 1) is then given 
as
k
β
IPD
(ρ)=
∞∑
i=0
β i · uPD(ρ(i))
where ρ(i) for i ≥ 0 denotes the ith element of a stream ρ ∈ Yω .
A strategy in PDω is an element of the ﬁnal coalgebra of the functor D(Y , PD). This can be represented as a ﬁnite 
automaton that reads in sequences of moves in PD and returns the strategy for the next round of the game [11].
Definition 19. The grim trigger strategy is given by the following automaton:
qcstart qd
(C,C)
=(C,C)
∗
where qc is the initial state, the transitions are labelled by inputs (the ∗ denotes an arbitrary letter) and the outputs are 
given by o(qc) = (C, C) and o(qd) = (D, D).
We see that the grim trigger strategy stays in the ‘cooperate state’ qc as long as both players cooperate, but moves to — 
and then stays forever in — the ‘defect state’ qd as soon as one player defects. We will now prove that this strategy is an 
equilibrium of PDω , if the discount factor β is large enough. Recall that the equilibrium EPDω is deﬁned as a greatest 
ﬁxpoint of the operator
	 : (PPDω )
(Yω→R×R) → (PPDω )
(Yω→R×R)
via conditions (1) and (2) on page 52. Therefore we will prove our claim by demonstrating that the grim trigger strategy is 
contained in a post-ﬁxpoint of 	; this is suﬃcient by Lemma 11. To ease presentation, we introduce the following notation:
Notation 20. Given a D(Y , PD)-coalgebra 〈now, ltr〉 : X →PD × X
Y , and a word w ∈ Y ∗ , we put for elements x ∈ X and 
functions k : Yω →R ×R
x(w) := l̂tr(x)(w) : X
kw := λy.k(wy) : Y → X
Here l̂tr(x) denotes the obvious extension of ltr(x) : Y → X to words.
Intuitively x(w) is the state that is reached in an automaton when starting at position x and reading the input word w . 
Likewise, kw should be thought of as calculating the payoff under the assumption that a ﬁnite sequence of moves w has 
been made already.
We now move to the deﬁnition of a post-ﬁxpoint χβ of 	.
Definition 21. We deﬁne a function χβ : (Yω →R ×R) →PPDω by
χβ(k) :=
{
qc(w) | w ∈ Y
∗,k= (k
β
IPD
)w
}
where qc denotes the initial state of the grim trigger strategy.
Since obviously qc ∈ χ
β(k
β
IPD
), in order to prove that the grim trigger strategy is an equilibrium (for large enough 
discount factor β), i.e. qc ∈ EPDω (k
β
IPD
), it suﬃces to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 22. The indexed predicate χβ as defined above is a post-fixpoint of 	, i.e.,
χβ(k)⊆	(χβ)(k) for all k : Yω →R×R,
if and only if β ≥ 1
3
.
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Proof. To prove this, we consider an arbitrary k : Yω → R × R and show that the inclusion holds. Let q ∈ χβ(k). Then by 
deﬁnition of χβ there is some w ∈ Y ∗ such that q = qc(w) and k = (k
β
IPD
)w . We need to verify the following conditions:
1. now(qc(w)) ∈ EPD(λy.ky(PPDω (ltr(qc(w))(y)))), and
2. ∀y′ ∈ Y . ltr(qc(w))(y
′) ∈ χβ(ky′ ).
Note that the second condition holds trivially by deﬁnition of χβ , so we only need to check the ﬁrst condition. We do this 
using a case distinction on qc(w).
Case qc(w)= qc In this case we have now(qc(w)) = (C, C) and it is easy to see that w = (C, C) . . . (C, C),
PPDω (qc(w(C, C))) = (C, C)
ω and PPDω (qc(wy)) = (D, D)
ω for all y ∈ {(C, D), (D, C), (D, D)}.
In order to check whether now(qc(w)) ∈ EPD(λy.ky(PPDω (qc(wy)))) we have to ensure that
π0k(C,C)((C,C)
ω)≥ π0
(
k(D,C)(D, D)
ω
)
π1k(C,C)((C,C)
ω)≥ π1
(
k(C,D)(D, D)
ω
)
We use n to denote the length of the word w = (C, C) . . . (C, C) (where n = 0 means that w is the empty word). Then
k(C,C)((C,C)
ω)= (−
∞∑
i=0
β i,−
∞∑
i=0
β i)
k(C,D)((D, D)
ω)= k
β
IPD
(w(C, D)(D, D)ω)
= (−
n−1∑
i=0
β i − 3
∞∑
i=n+1
β i,−
n−1∑
i=0
β i − 5βn − 3
∞∑
i=n+1
β i)
k(D,C)((D, D)
ω)= (−
n−1∑
i=0
β i − 5βn − 3
∞∑
i=n+1
β i,−
n−1∑
i=0
β i − 3
∞∑
i=n+1
β i)
Due to symmetry, the equilibrium condition amounts to the following inequality:
−
∞∑
i=0
β i ≥−
n−1∑
i=0
β i − 3
∞∑
i=n+1
β i
Cancelling the common history and using the formula 
∑∞
i=n β
i =
βn
1−β , we see that this holds if and only if β ≥
1
3
.
Case qc(w)= qd The argument works analogously. We now have (qd(w)) = (D, D) for all histories w and that 
PPDω ((qd(wy))) = (D, D)
ω for all y ∈ Y .
To check that qd(w) ∈ EPD(λy.ky(PPDω (qc(wy)))) we need to show that
π0k(D,D)((D, D)
ω)≥ π0
(
k(C,D)(D, D)
ω
)
π1k(D,D)((D, D)
ω)≥ π1
(
k(D,C)(D, D)
ω
)
As in the previous case, the utility produced from the history w will cancel, and we will be left with the inequality
−3
∞∑
i=0
β i ≥−5− 3
∞∑
i=1
β i
reducing to the true statement −3 ≥−5, independent of the value of β . 
In summary, we have shown:
Proposition 23. The grim trigger strategy is an equilibrium of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with discount factor β , i.e. qc ∈
EPDω (k
β
IPD
), if β ≥ 1
3
. 
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7. Conclusions and future work
The main contributions of this paper are on the one hand a notion of morphism between open games and — based on 
this notion — the representation of the inﬁnite iteration of a given game as a ﬁnal coalgebra. This provides a ﬁrst extension 
of the compositionality results from Ghani et al. [3] to inﬁnitely repeated games. Nevertheless a number of challenges 
remain: ﬁrstly, we need to extend our construction to state-full games and to games with non-trivial coutility function. The 
former seems straightforward. Of course we want to use this framework to provide new reasoning tools for such games 
based on coinduction and coalgebraic logics.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by EPSRC grants EP/M016951/1, EP/K023837/1, and EP/N015843/1. We thank Jules Hedges, 
Viktor Winschel, Philipp Zahn, Alexander Kurz, and the participants at the Open Games workshop in Glasgow 2017 for 
interesting discussions about open games and their iteration.
References
[1] S. Abramsky, V. Winschel, Coalgebraic analysis of subgame-perfect equilibria in inﬁnite games without discounting, Math. Structures Comput. Sci. 
27 (5) (2017) 751–761.
[2] R. Axelrod, D. Dion, The further evolution of cooperation, Science 242 (4884) (1988) 1385–1390.
[3] N. Ghani, J. Hedges, V. Winschel, P. Zahn, Compositional game theory, in: LICS, 2018, in press, arXiv:1603 .04641.
[4] P. Lescanne, Rationality and escalation in inﬁnite extensive games, arXiv:1112 .1185, 2012.
[5] G. Mailath, L. Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press, 2006.
[6] F. McGillivray, A. Smith, Trust and cooperation through agent-speciﬁc punishments, Int. Organ. 54 (4) (2000) 809–824.
[7] J. Nash, Non-cooperative games, Ann. of Math. 54 (2) (1951) 286–295.
[8] P. Oliva, T. Powell, A constructive interpretation of Ramsey’s theorem via the product of selection functions, Math. Structures Comput. Sci. 25 (8) (2015) 
1755–1778.
[9] J. Rutten, Universal coalgebra: a theory of systems, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 249 (1) (2000) 3–80.
[10] J. Rutten, D. Turi, Initial algebra and ﬁnal coalgebra semantics for concurrency, in: J.W. de Bakker, W.P. de Roever, G. Rozenberg (Eds.), A Decade of 
Concurrency Reflections and Perspectives, Springer, 1994, pp. 530–582.
[11] J.J.M.M. Rutten, Automata and coinduction (an exercise in coalgebra), in: D. Sangiorgi, R. de Simone (Eds.), CONCUR’98, Springer, 1998, pp. 194–218.
[12] R. Selten, Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit: Teil I: Bestimmung des Dynamischen Preisgleichgewichts, 
Z. Gesamte Staatswiss. 121 (2) (1965) 301–324.
[13] M. Shubik, Game Theory in the Social Sciences, The MIT Press, 1984.
